

finances (Bronstein, Griffin, Besaslan & As, 2014). Under the pretense of humanitarian organizations, many donors have channeled millions of dollars, technological know-how to enable the jihadist group advance its causes and operations.

The deliberate destruction of UNESCO world heritage sites such as the ancient city of Palmyra, Assyrian city in Nimrud, iconic religious sites especially Shiite mosques and valuable antiques such as those found in Mosul museum that were against its radical extremists Islamic views curtailed economic activities and development in Syria and Iraq (Taub, 2015).

Many villages and towns were destroyed by the jihadist group when fighting with the military forces. During its uprising, it used to destroy non-Muslim business as well as Shiite Muslim properties (Lister, 2016). This will have a long-term impact due to reduced income from the tourism industry as the culture and history of the region is destroyed.

The jihadist ground destroyed a lot of oil wells as well as shelling many buildings leaving a trail of destruction as it retreated to its stronghold in Mosul during the intensified US-led coalition against the terror group. This reduces Syria and Iraq oil production as it takes time to rehabilitate, construct and operate new oil and petroleum infrastructure (Solomon, Chazan & Jones, 2015). The war greatly hindered sustainable economic development. The continued military exchange between the Syrian and Iraqi forces against the militant group led to redirecting of funds and resources from more social needs to cater for the war expenses and humanitarian needs (Ianchovichina & Ivanic, 2016).

The Iraqi military initially suffered numerous setbacks, losing ammunition and expensive advanced military equipment to the jihadist. The countries involved in the fight against ISIS incurred huge direct and indirect economic consequences as a result of the effort to curtail the militant insurgency (Warrick, 2015). Trade ties among nations in the region were greatly hindered as the ISIS-controlled vast border crossing areas in Syria and Iraq. Both nations wasted many years in the conflict with the jihadist organization. This economical expense meant that these nations could not achieve their forecasted economic growth strategy, GDP projection since many critical sectors of the economy stalled or experienced retarded growth. The war against ISIS disrupted intraregional integration and cost the region loss of human capital and infrastructure as most professions ceased offering their services or migrated to more peaceful regions while critical infrastructural development was destroyed (Ianchovichina & Ivanic, 2016).

IV. CONCLUSION

Despite, the jihadist group providing the locals with social amenities such as food and refuge as well as free fuel. The insurgents committed crimes against humanity and war crimes; doing more long-term damage than good to the economy of both nations. It took four years for US, Russia, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Syria, Iraq military coalition, and

coordinated attacks to quell the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Lister, 2016).

This indicates the resilience and adaptability of the ISIS leadership and organization. As a fact, despite reduced capacity and casting dream to form a global caliphate under sharia law into oblivion. The terrorist organization adopted different types of insurgency thus conducting attacks against these governments and derailing the economy whenever possible.

ISIS has delayed the achievement of economic stability in Syria and Iraq. It is important to address socio-political issues that have fueled the terror group's popularity in the region to achieve any economic stability and sustainability in the future. As evident in the above analysis, the presence of ISIS in Syria and Iraq has had a damaging impact on the economy, and it will take immense financial, political and global support for the two nations to return to the prosperity of middle-income nations.

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